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INTRODUCTION
The STS-54 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report is a summary of the Orbiter,
External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster/Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
(SRB/RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) subsystems performance
during this fifty-third flight of the Space Shuttle Program, and the third
flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition to the Orbiter,
the flight vehicle consisted of an ET, which was designated ET-51; three SSME's,
which were serial numbers 2019, 2033, and 2018 in positions 1, 2, and 3,
respectively; and two retrievable and reusable SRB's which were designated
BI-056. The lightweight RSRM r s that were installed in each SRB were designated
360L029A for the left SRB, and 360L029B for the right SRB.
The primary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations to deploy
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-Fllnertial Upper Stage payload and to
fulfill the requirements of the Diffuse X-Ray Spectrometer (DXS) payload. The
secondary objective was to fly the Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space
(CHROMEX), Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA), Physiological and
Anatomical Rodent Experiment (PARE), and the Solid Surface Combustion Experiment
(SSCE).
The sequence of events for the six-day STS-54 mission is shown in Table 1 and
the official Orbiter and GFE Projects Problem Tracking List is shown in
Table II. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that
were provided to prepare this report. Appendix B defines the acronyms and
abbreviations used in the document.
` In addition to presenting a summary of subsystem performance, this report also
discusses each Orbiter, ET, SSME, SRB, and RSRM in-flight anomaly in the
applicable section of the report. The official tracking number for each
in-flight anomaly, assigned by the cognizant project, is also shown. All times
are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
This STS-54 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E, which
states that each major organizational element supporting the Program will report
the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify
all related in-flight anomalies.
The crew for this fifty-third Space Shuttle mission was John H. Casper, Col.,
USAF, Commander; Donald R. McMonagle, Lt. Col., USAF, Pilot; Mario Runco, Jr.,
Lt. Cdr., USN, Mission Specialist 1; Gregory J. Harbaugh, Civilian, Mission
Specialist 2; and Susan J. Helms, Major, USAF, Mission Specialist 3. STS-54 was
the second space flight for the Commander, Pilot, Mission Specialist 1, and
Mission Specialist 2, and the first space flight for Mission Specialist 3.
MISSION SUMMARY
The launch of the STS-54 vehicle occurred from KSC launch pad 39B at
13:13:59:29.989 G.m.t. (08:59:30 a.m. e.s.t. on January 13, 1993). The launch
was delayed 7 minutes 30 seconds for resolution of a Launch Systems Evaluation
and Advisory Team (LSEAT) violation. The vehicle was launched on a direct
insertion trajectory with a 28.45-degree inclination. The launch phase was
satisfactory in all respects.
After main engine cutoff (MECO), it was noted that water spray boiler (WSB) 3,
while operating on controller A, was no t cooling the lubrication oil of
auxiliary power unit (APU) 3. At a lubrication oil return temperature of 295°F
(lubrication oil return temperature is normally controlled to 250 1F), WSB 3 was
switched to controller B, but again no cooling was evident. As a result, when
APU 3 bearing temperature 1 reached 335°F, the APU was shut down in accordance
with flight rule 10-5A. Post-ascent data evaluation has shown approximately
35 seconds of cooling (water spraying) occurred about 40 seconds after APU 3
shutdown while operating on B controller. Analysis indicated that a freeze-up
of the VSB occurred. WSB 3/APU 3 cooled normally on both controllers during the
flight control system (FCS) checkout and during entry.
Supply pressures in hydraulic system 3 and 1 both showed anomalous pressure
recovery immediately following the post-MECO APU shutdown, and this condition
resulted in the early shutdvw-n of APU 3. The system 3 pressure, following an
initial drop from 3000 psia to 1600 psia over about 6 seconds, increased over
the next 4 seconds to 2400 psia and remained there for more than 40 seconds.
During the next 8 seconds, when the thrust vector control (TVC) isolation valves
were closed in a 1, 2, and 3 sequence, system 3 again dropped to the 1600—pcia
range, sharply recovered to 2800 psia, and finally dropped to the expected
reservoir pressure. Also, after APU 1 shutdown, hydraulic system 1 showed an
unexpected transient pressure recovery. The pressure dropped normally during a
postlanding test intended to recreate the problem. Also, the pressure dropped
normally during a similar shutdown sequence on a previous flight of OV-105
(STS-47). Analysis of the STS-54 data showed that the pressure recovery in
hydraulic system 3 was caused by back-driving speedbrake hydraulic motor 3,
converting motor into a hydraulic pump which repressurized the shutdown system.
Power to operated the back-driving pump was delivered through the differential
gearbox that normally combines the outputs of the three speedbrake motors.
A determination of vehicle performance was made using vehicle acceleration and
preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the average
flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time period
between SRB separation and start of 3-g throttling was 452.7 seconds as compared
to an average main propulsion system (MPS) tag value 452.87 seconds.
The 143.8-second orbital maneuvering subsystem (OHS) -2 maneuver was performed
as planned with a AV of 222 ft/sec, and the orbiter was placed in a 162 by
160 nmi. orbit. The payload bay doors were opened satisfactorily at
13:15:41:11 G.m.t. (00:01:41:41 MET).
The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS)/Ine •rtial Upper Stage (IUS) payload
was deployed nominally at 13:20:12:26 G.m.t. (00:06:12:56 MET). The TDRS
satellite is the fifth in a configuration of satellites that form the space
segment of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). This systems
was developed to provide user services to scientific and applications satellites
in near-Earth orbit and to the Space Shuttle. The TDRS was boosted to
geosynchronous orbit by the IUS.
2
At 13:20:27:26.1 G.m.t. (00:06:27:56.1 MET), the OHS 3 separation maneuver from
the TDRS/IUS was initiated. The firing used the left engine only and was
33.7 seconds in duration (AV = 30.4 ft/sec). The firing resulted in a new orbit
of 178.9 by 163.0 nmi. System operation during the firing was nominal.
The OMS-4 maneuver was completed nominally at 14:16:08:42.3 G.m.t.
(01:02:09:12.3 MET). The OMS-4 maneuver was a right-engine-only firing that was
27.3 seconds in duration and provided a 6V of 24.9 ft/sec.
A cabin depressurization to 10.2 psi was completed in preparation for the
planned extravehicular activity (EVA) on flight day 5.
The waste collection system (WCS) commode fault light illuminated at
16:14:22:09 G.m.t. (03:00:22:39 MET). A review of data indicates •ghat the
compactor caused the fault light to illuminate during the retraction phase of
the compaction cycle. A procedure, which was sent via the text and graphics
system (TAGS), was performed by crewmembers and confirmed the fault, which
disengages the motor. in-flight, the crew was told to power cycle the commode
prior to use if the light was on, as this re-enables the motor. The WCS
operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. Postflight
troubleshooting confirmed the problem to be the controller logic sensing the
current-limit condition too quickly at the end of the cycle and shutting the
compactor down.
The planned EVA was successfully initiated and the EVA crew egressed the Orbiter
at 17:10:48 G.m.t. (03:20:49 MET). The EVA was satisfactorily completed and the
official duration was 4 hours 27 minutes 50 seconds.
Fuel cell 2 was shut down as planned at 18:07:42:25 G.m.t. (04:17:42:55 MET).
Fuel cell temperatures decreased as expected. The fuel cell was to remain shut
down for 10 hours to meet the Development Test Objective (DTO). About 9 hours
after shutdown, the fuel cell stack temperatures had decreased from 185°F to
135°F, and the environmental temperature was between 70°F and 80°F, based on the
nitrogen system 2 tank 1 temperature. Fuel cell stack 2 temperatures were 130°F
to 135°F at the time of the restart at 18:16:44 G.m.t. (05:02:45 MET). No
anomalies were noted during startup, and the "Ready For Load 11 indication was
received 7 minutes after the start command.
The FCS checkout was completed at 18:OB:38:28.6 G.m.t. (04:18:38:58.6 MET).
APU 3 and WSB 3 were used with APU 3 running for 14 minutes 47 seconds. All APU
parameters were nominal, and the APU was operated until proper cooling was
achieved on both A and B WSB controllers. Two and one-half minutes after spray
initiation on the B controller, the A controller was selected. About 20 seconds
late, a 28-degree over-cool condition was noted during which the lubrication
oil return temperature went from 257°F to 227°F before recovering to a nominal
255°F where the temperatures stabilized and nominal operation was observed.
This overcooling condition did not pose a flight impact.
The rudder speedbrake switching valve failed to switch to the standby position
during each of the hydraulic system 3 circulation pump activations that occurred
during the mission. During a special run of circulation pump 3, the MPS thrust
vector control isolation valve was opened, increasing the differential pressure
across the switching valve. This differential pressure caused the switching
3
valve to move to the standby position. The switching valve performed as
expected during FCS checkout and entry. KSC testing verified that the switching
valve was operating nominally; however, under certain specific hydraulic balance
conditions, the switching valve may require as long as 30 seconds to change
state.
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) hot-fire was performed at 18:07:57 G.m.t.
(04:17:57 MET), and primary thruster R1R failed off due to low chamber pressure
(24.7 psia when it should have been 152 psia) on its first firing attempt. All
other thrusters operated nominally. The chamber pressure was at 10 psia for the
first 280 msec and then jumped to 25 Asia prior to deselection at 320 msec.
Injector temperature data indicated that both fuel and oxidizer flow had
occurred. The most probable failure mode is failure of the oxidizer valve main
stage to open due to nitrate contamination of the pilot stage.
Both payload bay doors were closed nominally by 19:10:04:14 G.m.t.
(05:20:04:44 MET). The deorbit maneuver was performed at 19:12:38:10.1 G.m.t.
(05:22:38:40.1 MET). The maneuver was approximately 153.4 seconds in duration
and the AV was 292.9 ft /sec.
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at Shuttle Landing Facility on concrete
runway 33 at 19.13.37:47 G.m.t. (05:23:38:17 MET) on January 19, 1993. Nose
landing gear touchdown occurred 15 seconds after main gear touchdown with the
Orbiter drag chute being deployed satisfactorily at 19:13:37:59.8 G.m.t. The
drag chute was jettisoned at 19:13:38:22.6 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at
19:13:38:36 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration
was 5 days 23 hours 38 minutes 19 seconds. All three APU's were powered down by
19:13:56:56.10 G.m.t. The crew completed the required postflight
reconfigurations and exited the Orbiter at 19:14:18 G.m.t.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
All SRB systems performed as expected. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal.
No SRB or RSRM Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operations and Maintenance
Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) violations occurred.
Power-up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters was
accomplished routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in
the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle joint and flexible
bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges. The heated ground purge
was also maintained in operation until launch minus 15 minutes to inert the aft
skirt area of any accumulation of hydrazine.
Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRM's was within the
allowable performance envelope, and was typical of the performance observed on
previous flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 70°F at
lift-off. The RSRM performance is delineated in the table on the following
page.
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RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter Left motor, 70°F Ri ht motor, 70°F
Predicted	 1 Actual Predicted Actual
Impulse gages
I-20, 106 lbf-sec 65.84 64.58 65.37 64.82
1-60, 10
	
lbf-sec 175.41 172.90 174.37 173.77
I-AT, 106 lbf-sec 296.92 296.27 296.75 296.91
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm 268.50 267.80 268.50 268.50
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60°F 0.3690 0.3657 0.3676 0.3668
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec @ 68°F 0.3716 0.3683 0.3702 0.3694
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
Web timea 109.50 110.90 110.20 110.80
Separation cue, 50 psia 119.50 120.60 120.00 120.00
Action time 121.30 122.70 122.00 122.60
Separation command, sec 125.44 125.96 125.44 125.96
PMBT, OF 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds 2.80 2.70 2.80 3.50
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
imbalance Predicted Actual
Impulse differential, N/A 707.30b
,Tailoff
klbf-sec
Notes:
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by
the letter a. These items are referenced to lift-off time (Ignition
interval).
b Tailoff imbalance is equal to left motor minus right motor, and was
calculated by Marshall Space Flight Center.
Postflight evaluation of the RSRM performance data revealed an unexpected
perturbation in the chamber pressure measurements of the right RSRM
approximately 67.5 seconds after lift-off (Flight Problem STS-54-M-1). The
perturbation consisted of a pressure spike of approximately 13-psi maximum with
an overall duration of 3 seconds. This pressure increase resulted in a thrust
imbalance of 76.5 Klbf. The thrust imbalance approached but did not exceed the
specification thrust imbalance limit of 85 Klbf. Pressure spikes of this nature
have been observed in the past, but this spike is the largest seen during the
Space Shuttle Program. Evaluation of this anomaly was continuing as the time of
report publication.
RSRM field joint heaters operated for 11 hours and 23 minutes. Power was
applied to the heating element 22 percent of the time during the prelaunch time
period when the LCC was applicable. This amount of heat maintained the field
joints in their normal operating temperature range. Igniter joint heaters
operated for 18 hours 17 minutes. Power was applied to the left and right
heating elements 42 and 56 percent of the time, respectively, to keep the
igniter joints in their normal operating range.
The flexible bearing temperatures were maintained above 60°F by intermittent
activation of the aft skirt GN2 purge. The purge was operated for a total of
seven hours 15 minutes to keep the nozzle-to-case-joint temperature ar:ve the
minimum LCC temperature of 75°F. To ensure all hazardous gases were removed
from the aft compartment, the purge was operated at high-flow rate from
T-33 minutes to launch. As a result of the purge operation, the flexible
bearing mean bulk temperature was 77°F.
Both SRB's were successfully separated from the ET at T-zero + 125.96 seconds,
and reports from the recovery area, based on visual sightings, indicate that the
deceleration subsystem performed as designed. Both SRB's were observed during
descent, and were retrieved and returned to KSC for disassembly and
refurbishment.
The postflight inspection of the igniter outer joint revealed a hair across the
primary and secondary seal footprints of the aft gasket face on the right RSRM.
The cause and corrective action for this condition are being resolved at this
writing.
EXTERNAL TANK
The ET flight performance was excellent. All objectives and requirements
associated with the ET propellant loading and flight operations were met. All
ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. ET purge
and heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No OMRSD
violations were identified.
Propellant loading was nominal. The ullage pressures in all LO  and LH 2 tanks
were within acceptable limits throughout loading, pressurization, and flight.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the period
of ullage pressure slump was a nominal 13.1 psid.
Typical ice/frost formations for the January atmospheric environment were
observed on the ET during the countdown. Normal quantities of ice or frost were
present on the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen feed lines and on the
pressurization line brackets. Also, some frost or ice was present along the
liquid hydrogen protruding air load (PAL) ramps. These observations were
acceptable per NSTS 08303. There was no observed ice or frost on the acreage of
the liquid oxygen or liquid hydrogen tank barrel.
The intertank purge heater and temperature control system operated successfully.
There were no LCC, OMRSD, or historical maximum temperature violations. The
objective of the intertank Purge was met with all temperatures inside the
intertank being maintained within acceptable limits. Also, there were no
hazardous gas violations in ttnis area.
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Development Test Objective 312 - ET Thermal Protection System Performance
Photography - was performed following ET separation. Discussion of the results
of the photographic evaluation are presented in the Development Test Objective
section of this re-:;rt.
ET separation was confirmed. Radar data from Bermuda confirmed that the ET
(with tumble valve disabled) did not tumble after ET/Orbiter separation. The
postflight impact point was within the expected footprint and about 37 miles
from the predicted point.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameters appeared normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were
typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights.
Engine "Ready" was achieved at the planned time, all LCC were met, and engine
start and thrust buildup were normal. All Interface Control Document (ICD)
start and shutdown transient requirements were met. Flight data indicate that
SSME performance during start, mainstage, throttling, shutdown and propellant
dump operations was as predicted and cutoff times for SSME 1, 2, and 3 were
516.29, 516.41, and 516.53 seconds, respectively. The Isp was rated as
452.68 seconds based on trajectory data. The high pressure oxidizer turbopump
(HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were well within
specification throughout engine operation. Two anomalies were identified and
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
An increase in the SSME 1 HPOTP synchronous vibration amplitude of 1g rms (based
on 11-point sliding average) was noted (Flight Problem STS-54-E-1). The
amplitude increased to a maximum of 3.2g rms at 104 percent on accelerometer
location 135-1. The average synchronous amplitude of the three HPOTP
accelerometers reached the acceptance test specification of 3g rms. No
bearing-related frequencies were evident at any time during the flight. The
pump was disassembled after flight and no hardware anomalies were found. This
is consistent with diagnostic disassemblies of ,,amps after ground tests that
have exhibited synchronous vibrations of this magnitude.
A single negative spike of 0.6 psia was noted on the channel A (HPOTP) secondary
seal cavity (SSC) pressure sensor on SSME 3 (Flight Problem STS-54-E-2). The
spike occurred at engine .Mart + 85.6 seconds. No other anomalies occurred
during chill, mainstage, or the post-shutdown phases. The spiking was most
likely caused by contamination in the pressure transducer. This pressure
transducer had experienced six starts and 1,567 seconds of run time; however,
this was the first flight for this sensor. The sensor was replaced. Failure
analysis indicated contamination was present in the sensor; however, a particle
capable of causing the fai lure was not identified.
SPACE SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the
countdown and flight.
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As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power was turned off
prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM
Main Proaulsion Subsystem
The overall performance of the MPS was as expected. Liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen loading was performed as planned with no stop flows or reverts. No
OMRSD or LCC violations were identified.
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant gas concentrations
were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the Orbiter aft
compartment, which occurred shortly after the start of fast fill, was a
corrected value of 135 ppm, and this value compares favorably with previous data
for this vehicle. The oxygen concentration level was 25 ppm, and the helium
concentration was initially 10,700 ppm, but it fell below the LCC maximum level
of 10,000 ppm before the LCC limits became effective.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish, versus
the inventory loads resulted in a loading accuracy of -0.004 percent for liquid
hydrogen, and +0.04 percent for liquid oxygen. During loading of the helium
supply for SSME 2, the helium pressure reached 4500 psis, which is the LCC upper
limit; however, the pressure did not violate the LCC.
Ascent MPS performance appeared to be completely normal. The GO fixed orifice
pressurization system performed as expected. The GH2 pressurization system also
performed nominally. Evaluation of the flow control valve data revealed normal
operations. Preliminary data indicate that the liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all net positive
suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The
gaseous hydrogen flow control valves for SSME 1 cycled 15 times, 57 times for
SSME 2, and 0 tines for SSME 3. Performance analyses of the propulsion systems
during start, mainstage, and shutdown operations indicated that performance was
nominal and all requirements were met. MECO occurred at lift-off plus
509.9 seconds.
The MPS propellant dump operations were nominal, and the MPS operations were
nominal during entry and landing, and 55.6 lb of helium were consumed during
entry.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS met all mission requirements in a nominal manner. Propellant
consumption during the six-day mission was 4910.5 lbm, which includes dumping
the forward RCS to zero percent prior to landing.
The forward RCS thruster FU fuel valve appeared to have a transient leak after
its first firing when the fuel injector temperature dropped to 42°F. The
temperature began recovering about 30 seconds after the firing. A second
intermittent leak condition was noted about 30 seconds after the seventh firing
of thruster F3L. Neither leak was of sufficient magnitude to cause the thruster
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to be failed by the redundancy management (RM) system. There was no other
forward RCS manifold 3 thruster activity at the time of the leak indications.
Data did not snow any repeat of this intermittent leak condition during the
remainder of the mission.
Primary thruster R1R failed off due to low chamber pressure (Flight Problem
STS-54-V-05) on its first firing attempt at 18:07:58:02 G.m.t. (04:17:58:32 MET)
during the RCS hot fire. The chamber pressure was 10 Asia for the first
280 cosec of the firing, and then jumped to 25 psia just before the thruster was
deselected at 320 msec. All other thrusters operated nominally. The injector
temperature data indicated that both fuel and oxidizer flow had occurred. The
thruster remained deselected for the remainder of the mission. The most
probable failure mode is failure of the oxidizer valve main stage to open due to
nitrate contamination of the pilot stage.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS performance was excellent. Four firings of the OMS engines were
performed of which two were dual-engine firings and the other two were
single-engine firings. The total firing time was 330.9 seconds for the
left-hand engine and 323.5 seconds for the right-hand engine. Propellant
consumption for the OMS was 12,587 lb with 7885 lb of oxidizer and 4702 lb of
fuel used.
The gauging system performance was nominal throughout the mission, and all
post-firing quantities were within one percent of calculated values. As a
result, preliminary data indicate that the gauge values should be usable for
loading purposes on the next OV-105 flight.
The following table presents the pertinent parameters for each firing.
OMS
firing
Eogine
used
Time, G.m.t./MET Firing
duration,
sec
AV,
ft/sec
2 Both 13:14:38:23.4 G.m.t. 143.8 222.0
00:00:38:53.4 MET
3 Left-engine 13:20:27:26.1 G.m.t. 33.7 30.4
00:06:27:56.1 MET
4 Right-engine 14:16:08:42.3 G.m.t. 27.3 24.9
01:02:09:12.3 MET
Deorbit Both 19:12:38:10.2 G.m.t. 153.4 292.9
05:22:38:40.2 MET
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission. The vehicle was flown in a four-tank-set configuration,
and a total of 1471.4 lb lb of oxygen and 176.9 lb of hydrogen was consumed
during the mission. Of the oxygen amu,.int used, 66.8 lb of oxygen was used by
the crew for life support. The mission extension capability at an average power
level of 14.4 kV was 111.5 hours.
The crew reported during the postflight crew debriefing that an attempt was made
to close the oxygen tank manifold 1 isolation valve prior to the sleep period
following flight day 4 activities. The switch was held on for 2 to 3 seconds,
however the valve did not close. A second attempt was made during which the
switch was held in position for 2 seconds, and the valve closed. This is a
repeat of the anomaly experienced on this valve during STS-49 (Flight Problem
STS-49-V-02). Failure analysis was performed on an OV-104 manifold valve which
has shown similar behavior.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cells performed nominally in producing 2061.8 kWh of electricity. In
producing this electricity, the fuel cells also produced 1581.5 lb of water.
The first attempt to wait 72 hours between fuel cell purges was shortened to
50 hours when the voltage decay reached the 0.2-volt limit. The voltage decay
rate was higher than normal because of slightly higher nitrogen impurity levels
in the oxygen. Reactant purity levels were well within specification, and the
observed voltage decay rate had no mission impact. A total of six purges were
performed at the following mission elapsed times: 27 hours; 77 hours; 98 hours;
111 hours (fuel. cells 1 and 3 only); 123 hours; and 134 hours. The actual fuel
cell voltage decay at the end of the mission was 0.1 V above the predicted for
fuel cell 1 and 3, and 0.05 V above predicted for fuel cell 2. These decay
rates had no effect on the mission.
Fuel cell 2 was shut down as planned at 018:07:42:25 G.m.t. (04:17:42:55 MET).
Fuel cell temperatures decreased as expected. The fuel cell was to remain shut
down for 10 hours to meet the DTO. About 9 hours after shutdown, the fuel cell
stack temperatures had decreased from 185°F to 135°F, and the environmental
temperature was between 70°F and 80°F, based on the nitrogen system 2 tank 1
temperature. Fuel cell stack 2 temperatures were 130 1F to 135°F at the time of
the restart at 018:16:44 G.m.t. (05:02:56:30 MET). No anomalies were noted
during startup, and the "Ready For Load" indication was received 7 minutes after
the start command. The fuel cell operated satisfactorily for the remainder of
the mission.
During on-orbit operations, the temperature of the fuel cell 2 alternate water
line was higher than normal, indicating water weeping past the fuel cell
alternate water line check valve (Flight Problem STS-54-V-07). During entry at
19:13:30 G.m.t. (05:23:31 MET), the temperature of the fuel cell 3 alternate
water line began rising and peaked at 127°F 30 minutes after landing (Flight
Problem STS-54-V-07). The alternate water line temperature peaking at the same
temperature as the primary water line indicates significant flow past the
alternate water line check valve. Modified OMRSD check valve tests will be
performed during turnaround.
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Auxiliary Power Unit
The APU subsystem performed nominally throughout the mission, but some minor
problems are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The following table
presents the APU run times and fuel consumption by APU serial number and
position.
IAPU 1 (SIN 303) IAPU 2 (SIN 401) IAPU 3 (SIN 207)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
lb lb lb
Ascent 20:31 51 20:32 52 19:08 47
FCS checkout 14:47 31
Entry
a 62:09 134 83:43 168 61:04 121
Totals 82:0 185 1 104:15 220 94:59 1	 199
Notes:
a IAPU 1 ran for 18 minutes 28 seconds after landing (touchdown), IAPU
ran for 19 minutes 09 seconds after landing, and IAPU 3 ran for
17 minutes 24 seconds after landing. The lengthened running time was
the result of special WSB checks that were run after landing.
APU 3 did not receive any hydraulic cooling during ascent (The Hydraulics/dater
Spray Boiler Subsystem section of this report contains a detailed discussion of
the WSB operation during ascent.) As a result of no cooling and prior to the
early shutdown of APU 3, the APU lubrication oil outlet temperature reached
317°F (FDA limit = 305°F), lubrication oil return temperature reached 317°F (FDA
limit = 290 0F), gearbox bearing temperature 1 reached 340°F (FDA limit = 335 0F),
and gearbox bearing temperature 2 also reached 340°F (No FDA limit). None of
these temperatures exceeded APU reuse limits. It is suspected that water had
frozen on the WSB spray bar. APU 3 functioned normally during FCS checkout and
during entry.
The APU 1, 2, and 3 fuel tank/line/water-system B heaters were activated about
15 minutes after post-ascent APU shutdown when the test line temperature for
each system approached the lower FDA limit of 48°F. The temperatures returned
to the normal range once heater cycling began. Activation was completed prior
to violation of the FDA limit. This same situation occurred the previous two
flights of OV-105 and is normal for the configuration of OV-105. Postflight
analysis is continuing to determine an appropriate solution to this condition.
The APU 1 fuel pump/gas generator valve module (GGVH) heater system A shifted
its on/off cycle points from about a 15° cycle band to a 10°F band about three
days into the mission. The cycling was repeatable and showed no signs of
degradation.
The APU 2 and 3 seal cavity drain pressure decreased while on orbit. APU 2
decreased from 15 psia to 8 psis over 5 1/2 days and APU 3 decreased from
18 psia to 3 psia over 2 days. The leakage was most probably from the drain
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relief valve, which will be tested during turnaround as a part of the normal
OMRSD checks. The relief valves are the new design (-003). Leakage from the
APU 2 seal cavity drain was noted on the previous flight of OV-105 (STS-47).
This leakage did not impact normal flight operations.
The FCS checkout was completed at 18:08:38:28.6 G.m.t. (04:18:38:58.6 MET).
APU 3 and WSB 3 were used with APU 3 running for 14 minutes 47 seconds. All APU
parameters were nominal.
F `.ng entry at 19:13:27 G.m.t. (05:23:47 MET), the APU 3 bearing temperature
was erratic for a period of 17 seconds (Flight Problem STS-54-V-10). The APU
had been operating for about 35 minutes when the condition occurred. The APU
recovered and operated nominally for the remainder of the mission and
postlanding soakback.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
Hydraulics/water spray boiler operation was acceptable during the STS-54
mission.
After MECO, it was noted that WSB 3, while operating on controller A, was not
cooling the lubrication oil of APU 3 (Flight Problem STS-54- V-01). At a
lubrication oil return temperature of 295 °F (lubrication oil return temperature
is normally controlled to 250°F), WSB 3 was switched to controller B, but again
no cooling was evident. As a result, when the APU 3 bearing temperature 1
reached about 335°F, the APU was shut down in accordance with Flight Rule 10-5A.
Post-ascent data evaluation has shown that while operating on B controller,
approximately 35 seconds of cooling (water spraying) occurred about 40 seconds
after APU 3 shutdown. Preliminary,
 analysis indicates that a freeze-up of the
WSB occurred.
The FCS checkout was completed using WSB 3 with APU 3 running for 14 minutes
47 seconds. The APU was operated until proper cooling was achieved on both A
and B WSB controllers. Two and one-half minutes after spray initiation on the
B controller, the A controller was selected. About 20 seconds later, a
28-degree over-cool condition was noted during which the lubrication oil return
temperature went from 257°F to 227 °F before recovering to a nominal 255°F where
the temperatures stabilized and nominal operation was observed. This
overcooling condition did not pose a flight impact.
Supply pressures in hydraulic system 3 and 1 both showed anomalous pressure
recovery immediately following the post-MECO APU shutdown, and this condition
resulted in the early shutdown of APU 3. The system 3 pressure, following an
initial drop from 3000 psia to 1600 psia over about 6 seconds, increased over
the next 4 seconds to 2400 psia and remained there for more than 40 seconds
(Flight Problem STS-54-V-08). During the next 8 seconds, when the thrust vector
control (TVC) isolation valves were closed in a 1, 2, and 3 sequence, system 3
again dropped to the 1600-psia range, sharply recovered to 2800 psia, and
finally dropped to the expected reservoir pressure. Also, after the normal
APU 1 shutdown, hydraulic system 1 showed an unexpected transient pressure
recovery. The pressure dropped normally during a postlanding test intended to
recreate the problem. Also, the pressure dropped normally during a similar
shutdown sequence on a previous flight of OV-105 (STS-47).
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Analysis of the STS-54 data showed that the pressure recovery in hydrauli:
system 3 was caused by back-driving speedbrake hydraulic motor 3, converting the
motor into a hydraulic pump which repressurized the shutdown system. Power to
operate the back-driving pump was delivered through the differential gearbox
that normally combines the outputs of the three speedbrake motors.
Additionally, the APU 2 and 3 data showed an abrupt 8-horsepower increase during
the 40-second period, and this closely correlated with the 8.4 horsepower
required in system 3 to pump the estimated 6 gallons per minute quiescent flow
to the observed 2400 psia.
Two concurrent conditions must exist for back-drive to occur; that is the
speedbrake must have the hard-closed command present, and the supply pressure in
one of the hydraulic supplies must have declined to a threshold range for an
adequate dwell time (> 2 seconds). The conditions leading to the observed
pressure recovery are a previously unrecognized characteristic of the
rudder/speedbrake system, rather than a failure of system components. A
detailed assessment of the effects of this condition on the ascent and entry
flight performance indicate that the systems can withstand this condition,
although it is undesirable.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission. Performance of the EPDC components of
the drag chute system performed satisfactorily.
Fuel cell 2 was shut down for 9 hours in support of DTO 0412. The fuel cell was
successfully restarted with the ready-to-load indications received seven minutes
after the start command.
During the crew debriefing, the crew reported having difficulty sleeping because
of the excessive acoustical noise generated by the extravehicular mobility unit
(EMU) power supply and battery charger (Flight Problem STS-54-V-11). A request
to obtain acoustical data on STS-57 is being recommended so that the proper
corrective action can be taken.
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performed nominally throughout the
mission with the exception of one failure that occurred prior to 'launch. The
flash evaporator system (FES) high-load duct temperature measurement, located on
the outboard zone, did not rise at its normal rate when heater string A was
activated. Troubleshooting conducted on redundant heater strings B and C
verified that both strings were functioning properly. Heater string B was
selected for launch and operated within its control band for the remainder of
the mission.
FES temperature oscillations were noted during ascent and , also during the
deorbit preparations. The oscillations were similar to those experienced on the
two previous flights of this vehicle. This condition did not impact operations.
No oscillations were seen with the primary B controller used for entry.
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The radiator cold soak provided cooling for 4 minutes after landing. The
ammonia boiler system (ABS) primary B was operated for 35 minutes, and the
primary A was operated for 20 minutes before ground cooling was connected and
operational.
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performance was nominal throughout
the mission with no problems identified. The CO 2 partial pressure was
maintained below a nominal level of 3.50 mm Hg. The cabin air temperature and
relative humidity peaked at 80°F and 56 percent, respectively. The avionics
bays 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures peaked at 104.°F, 105°F, and 87°F,
respectively. The avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 water coldplate temperatures peaked
at 89°F, 90°F, and 79°F, respectively.
The pressure control system parameters all remained within anticipated ranges
throughout the mission. The pressure control system was used in support of the
cabin depressurization to 10.2 psia on flight day 3, the airlock and cabin
repressurizations on flight day 5.
Based on nitrogen consumption (1.8 lbm/day vs. 4.5 lbm/day), an unusually low
cabin pressure leakage was noted throughout the mission. Additionally, odors
were noted by the crew in the area of the volume F. These two factors indicate
that adequate venting was not being provided to the volume F wet trash.
Postflight checks by KSC personnel revealed a dynatube adapter plug in the
opening of the wet trash to vacuum. (This problem was initially defined as
Flight Problem STS-54-V-06; however, a decision was made to delete this item as
an anomaly and transfer it to KSC as an action item to be corrected.)
The supply water and waste management system performed normally throughout the
mission. By the completion of the mission, all of the associated in-flight
checkout requirements were performed and satisfied. The FES operated
satisfactorily in performing all supply water dumps. The supply water dump line
temperature was maintained between 70°F and 104°F throughout the mission with
the operation of the line heater.
Waste water was gathered at the predicted rate with one waste water dump being
performed at an average dump rate of 1.81 percent/minute (3.0 lb/min). The
waste dump line temperature was maintained between 54°F and 78°F while the
vacuum vent line temperature was maintained between 57°F and 81°F.
At approximately 14:12:59 G.m.t. (00:23:00 MET), the ac bus 1 currents indicated
that the commode fan was still on after a commode use three hours earlier.
Evaluation showed that the commode lid microswitch had probably not closed and
switched the commode fan off after the last use, and that fully closing and
latching the commode lid would switch the fan off. Instructions were given to
the crew who verified that the commode fan was running. The crew then cycled
the commode lid and the fan switched off. To prevent future occurrences of this
condition, the crew was ins^ructed to ensure that the lid was fully closed and
latched after each use. This condition is not considered a problem, and it did
not impact the flight.
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The Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) waste collection system (VCS) operated
successfully throughout the mission on its first flight. At approximately
016:14:22:09 G.m.t. (03:00:22:39 MET), the WCS commode fault light illuminated
(Flight Problem STS-54-V-03). A review of data indicated that the compactor
caused the fault light to illuminate during the retraction phase of the
compaction cycle. A procedure was performed and confirmed the fault, which
disengages the motor. In-flight, the crew was told to power cycle the commode
prior to use if the light was on, as this re-enables the motor. Postflight
troubleshooting confirmed the problem to be the controller logic sensing the
current-limit con.dition.too quickly at the end of the cycle and shutting the
compactor down. The commode fault disengages the motor. The WCS operated
satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression
All smoke detection system parameters remained within normal ranges throughout
the flight. The use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Airlock Support System
The airlock system was used to support the extravehicular activity on flight
day 5. All airlock system parameters remained within anticipated ranges.
Avionics and Software Subsystems
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem performance was
nominal throughout the flight. During ascent, elevon load relief occurred at
approximately Mach 0.9. This was nominal but not a predicted condition because
the phenomenon has been observed only two previous times during the Space
Shuttle Program. These two occurrences were on the last two flights of the
OV-105 vehicle (STS-47 and STS-49).
The flight control system performed nominally throughout the flight. The rudder
speedbrake secondary switching valve failed to switch to the standby position at
normal circulation pump pressure (TVC isolation valve closed) and nominal return
pressure (Flight Problem STS-54-V-04). During a special run of circulation pump
3, the MPS TVC isolation valve was opened by increasing the differential
pressure across the switching valve to 470 psia. This differential pressure
caused the switching valve to move to the standby position. The switching valve
performed as expected during FCS checkout and entry. The preliminary analysis
has indicated a sticky switching valve.
The inertial measurement unit (IMU) and star tracker performed satisfactorily
throughout the mission. The data processing system (DPS) hardware and software
also performed very well with no anomalies or problems noted.
The displays and controls subsystem performed nominally; however, an anomaly was
noted in that three payload bay floodlights did not operate properly (Flight
Problem STS-54-V-09). The forward starboard and mid starboard floodlights
failed to illuminate during the EVA. The mid port floodlight did not illuminate
for about 1 hour after switch activation.
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The operational instrumentation performed nominally with no anomalies or
problems reported.
Communications and Tracking Subsystem
The performance of the communications and tracking subsystem was nominal. The
tactical air navigation (TACAN) 2 was not able to maintain good bearing lock
during much of the countdown period, but the unit operated satisfactorily during
ascent and entry.
Payload Operations reported a total of five occurrences of Communications
Security (COMSEC) equipment hangup when the uplink commands were not
authenticated due to a known characteristic of the particular COMSEC unit. Each
time the hangup occurred, uplink modulation was removed and reapplied to recover
the command capability. There is a potential for the COMSEC to hang up and quit
processing commands when there is a momentary interruption of data to the
COMSEC. This condition is a known characteristic of the COMSEC equipment.
Closed circuit television (CCTV) camera D did not have a scene image (Flight
Problem STS-54-V-02A). The downlink video also did not have any scene image;
however, random streaks were noted across the image area. Analysis of the
CCTV camera D problem has shown that on flight day 1, CCTV camera D originally
produced normal, good-quality video of payload bay scenes. Approximately 5
hours into the flight, it was discovered that the camera temperature had reached
54 °C after the camera had remained in operation for an extended period of time.
The 54 °C temperature is 9 degrees above the redline temperature at which the
caution and warning system should sound an alarm. However, the alarm had been
disabled to permit use of the camcorder on the downlink. Although the camera
should not have experienced a failure solely due to reaching 54 °C, the high
temperature most likely contributed to the failure. CCTV camera D was checked
later 'in the mission and the quality of the video was normal, however the camera
continued to produce unusable video on an intermittent basis.
During the EVA, CCTV camera B was being used in the split-screen mode and a
synchronization problem occurred between camera B and the CCTV system (Flight
Problem STS-54-V-02B). After the camera was cycled, split-screen operations
were nominal, and the camera continued to operate nominally. Analysis
indicates that the problem was caused by camera B and not the video switching
unit. Camera B video will be examined postflight to determine if further
testing and repair is requested.
Momentary red and green horizontal lines were noted near the lower quarter of
the image that was seen from downlinked CCTV camera A video (Flight Problem
STS-54-V-02C). This condition was noted on several of the separate downlinks of
camera video. Downlink video will be examined during postflight activities to
determine the need for further testing and repair.
The crew reported that when using CCTV camera C on-orbit, only the brightest
stars were visible in a low-light scene (Flight Problem STS-54-V-02D). This
condition was indicative of a high-gain circuit problem. The camera was removed
and sent to Johnson Space Center (JSC) for evaluation.
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Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
All mechanically actuated subsystems performed nominally. STS-54 was the sixth
flight of the drag chute system. The drag chute was deployed as planned prior
to nose landing gear touchdown and all operations were nominal. The drag chute
was jettisoned 22.8 seconds after deployment.
Five pieces of black tile, the largest of which measured 8 inches by 1.25 inches
by 0.75 inch were found in the vicinity of the pilot chute at the 6200-foot
marker. These tile fragments originated from the vertical stabilizer "stinger"
and were dislodged by contact with the drag chute riser lines during deployment.
Aside from this usual damage to the vertical stabilizer "stinger", the drag
chute functioned normally. All drag chute hardware was recovered, appeared to
be in good condition, and showed no signs of abnormal operation.
The landing and braking data are presented in the following table.
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ft/sec Pitch rate,
ft keas de /sec
Main gear touchdown 1536 211.5 -2.0 n/a
Nose gear touchdown 6247 148.9 n/a 2.68
Braking initiation speed
	
109.6 knots (keas)
Brake-on time	 25.0 seconds (not sustained)
Rollout distance	 8,723	 feet
Rollout time	 49.2 seconds
Runway	 33	 (concrete) at KSC
Orbiter weight at landing 	 197,470	 lb (landing e.r-zimate)
Peak
Brake sensor location pressure, Brake assembly Energy,
psia million ft-lb
Left-hand inboard 1 1248 Left-hand outboard 16.21
Left-hand inboard 3 1272 Left-hand inboard 17.90
Left-hand outboard 2 1284 Right-hand inboard 12.77
Left-hand outboard 4 1092 Right-hand outboard 10.96
Right-hand inboard 1 1116
Right-hand inboard 3 1044
Right-hand outboard 2 948
Right-hand outboard 4 936
Aerodynamics, Heating, and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent aerodynamics were nominal with elevon load relief being commanded at
approximately Mach 0.9. This load relief was not predicted; however, it has
been seen on the previous two flights of OV-105 (STS-47 and STS-49). Although
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the cause of the load relief is not fully understood, the relief was transient
and the system responded as designed. The STS-47 postflight data evaluation was
unable to identify a cause for the load relief on that flight.
The descent aerodynamics were nominal with the control surfaces responding
generally as expected. The angle of attack varied 1 to 2 degrees from
predictions between Mach 9.0 and 4.0, but it did not impact the descent in any
manner.
The integrated heating (aerodynamic and plume) was nominal during ascent and
heating to the SSME nozzles was nominal.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem (TCS) was nominal throughout
the mission with only one heater failure occurring prior to launch. All Orbiter
subsystem temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits during all
phases of the mission.
The FES high load duct outboard zone heater system A failed off prior to launch.
This failure did not impact the mission.
Thermal data were obtained on fuel cell/environment decay rates during the
performance of DTO 312 - Fuel Cell Shutdown and Restart on Orbit. These data
were gathered in support of the long-duration Orbiter requirements.
The starboard main landing gear brake line temperature increased to 244°F
following activation of the heaters during deorbit preparation. This condition
has been noted on previous flights and is being corrected by the investigation
involving flight problem STS-52-V-18.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating during entry was nominal with all structural temperatures
remaining within limits, and all structural temperature rise rates remaining
within the experience base. The local heating was also within normal limits.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performed satisfactorily throughout the
mission, based on structural temperature response data. The overall boundary
layer transition from laminar to turbulent flow was symmetric. Transition
occurred at 1220 seconds after entry interface on the forward side of the
vehicle (X/L = 0.3), and at 1215 seconds after entry interface on the aft
portion of the vehicle (X/L = 0.6).
The inspection of the Orbiter TPS following landing revealed that the TPS had
sustained a total of 131 hits, of which 14 had a major dimension of one-inch or
greater. Debris impact damage, however, was less than average. A comparison of
these numbers to statistics from previous missions.of similar configuration
indicates that the number of hits larger than one inch is less than average.
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The Orbiter lower surface sustained 80 hits of which 14 had a major dimension of
one inch or greater. The distribution of hits on the lower surface does not
suggest a single source of ascent debris, but it does indicate a shedding of ice
and TPS debris from random sources. The Orbiter upper surface had a total of
34 hits and none had dimensions greater than one inch. The right side had five
hits, the left side had none, the right OMS pod had 10, the left OMS pod had
two, and none of these hits had a major dimension greater than one inch.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes.
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was much less than average. The SSME dome
mounted heat shield (DMHS) closeout blanket sacrificial panels were partially
detached and some material was missing from 9:00 to 9:30 o'clock on SSME 3. The
outer edge of the SSME 2 panels from 2:30 to 3:30 o'clock were detached and the
underlying batting was exposed. Some of the sacrificial panel and batting was
missing. The outer blanket edge from 5:30 to 7:00 o'clock on SSME 1 was frayed.
All of the remaining DMHS blankets were in excellent condition.
The Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing with several streaks.
Only a very light haze was present on the other forward-facing windows. Surface
wipes were taken from windows 1 through 9 for laboratory analysis.
A sweep of the runway after landing revealed the remains of a bird at the
6400-foot marker; however, no evidence of contact or damage to the Orbiter from
striking the bird was found. Unexpected flight hardware found on the runway
consisted of three 0-felt plugs that were located 8 feet from the runway
centerline at the 5800-foot marker.
A portable Shuttle thermal imager (STI) was used to measure the surface
temperatures of three areas of the Orbiter. Twenty-one minutes after landing,
the Orbiter reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) nosecap was 243°F. Twenty-eight
minutes after landing, the right-hand wing leading edge RCC panel 9 was 186°F,
and panel 17 was 182°F.
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
On flight day 4, the crew performed the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU)
checkouts while at a cabin pressure of 10.2 psia. Both units performed as
expected, and no anomalies were noted. Following the EMU checkout, the units
remained attached to the airlock adapter plates in preparation for the planned
EVA on flight day 5 in support of DTO 1210.
The planned EVA was performed on flight day 5 following nominal EMU donning and
a 40-minute prebreathe period. During the EVA, both units performed as expected
and both extravehicular crew members were pleased with the EMU. Real-time data
were received from both units throughout the EVA with the exception of the time
when the S-band communications link was inoperative. Following the EVA, the
units were recharged with oxygen and the batteries were placed on overnight
recharge.
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Total EVA time for this flight is officially recorded as 4 hours, 27 minutes,
50 seconds. This is the time interval between placing the units on internal
battery power and the beginning of airlock repressurization at the end of the
EVA.
GOVERNMENT FURBISHED EQUIPMENT/FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
The Government furnished equipment/flight crew equipment performed as designed
throughout the mission.
PAYLOADS
TRACKING AND DATA RELAY SATELLITE/INERTIAL UPPER STAGE SPACECRAFT
The TDRS satellite is the fifth in a configuration of satellites that form the
space segment of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). This
systems was developed to provide user services to scientific and applications
satellites in near-Earth orbit and to the Space Shuttle. The TDRS was boosted
to geosynchronous orbit by the IUS.
The TDRS/IUS was successfully deployed from the Orbiter cargo bay at
13:19:13 G.m.t. (00:06:13 MET). Prior to the IUS solid rocket motor-2 (SRM-2)
burn, the B-side stage 1 battery failed. This removed power from the entire
B-side and also failed redundant inertial measurement unit (RIMU) channel 3,
causing a memory fault on the A-side. Although the A-side took control, it
voted itself not-okay because of the memory fault. In addition, the spacecraft
experienced attitude perturbations that are believed to have been caused by
venting from the failed battery. These perturbations were compensated for by
the IUS and the A-side provided the correct mission sequencing for the SRM-2.
The TDRS spacecraft successfully separated from the IUS at 14:02:10 G.m.t.
(00:13:10 MET). The TDRS spacecraft remains healthy and was in the initial
phase of testing as this report was being written. The TDRS drifted at about
3 to 5 degrees per day to its checkout position at 150 degrees West longitude,
where 5 to 6 weeks of detailed equipment calibration began.
DIFFUSE X-RAY SPECTROMETER
The DXS payload was sponsored by Goddard Space Flight Center and collected data
on X-ray radiation from diffuse sources in deep space. The DXS vas designed to
determine the wavelength and intensity of the strongest X-ray lines emitted by
the hot stellar gases released by supernovas.
The DXS payload was activated soon after the payload bay doors were opened at
about 13:15:30 G.m.t. (00:01:30 MET). The DXS began scanning operations on
revolution 7. On revolutions 10 and 11, the starboard and port instruments,
respectively, experienced problems with high counts causing the high voltage to
automatically shut down. It was theorized that these problems were caused by a
time lag (very small) of the internal high voltage turn-off logic during the
high radiation regions of the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), and this time lag
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allowed formation of hydrocarbon deposits on the high-voltage anode wires in the
detectors. A bakeout procedure in which the internal heaters were commanded to
a higher temperature followed by a vigorous P-10 gas purge significantly
improved the results on the port instrument. The starboard instrument continued
to receive these bakeout procedures throughout the mission, enabling it to
capture some useful data.
Because of these problems, 15 extra orbits of data-taking opportunities were
planned of which 12 were used for scanning, and three for an additional bakeout
procedure on both instruments. DXS completed its data takes on revolution 90
followed by deactivation and instrument relatch o;: revolution 91.
The port instrument obtained 48,915 seconds of confirmed good data of the
planned 55,220 seconds. The starboard instrument obtained 31,200 seconds of
confirmed good data of the planned 32,850 seconds.
CHROMOSOME AND PLANT CELL DIVISION IN SPACE
The objective of the Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space (CHROMEX) was
to investigate reproductive abnormalities which apparently occur in plants
exposed to microgravity.
The CHROMEX activity was monitored by the crew on a daily basis and no anomalies
were noted.
COMMERCIAL GENERIC BIOPROCESSING APPARATUS
The objective of the Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA)
experiment was to perform biological sample processing and stow it for return to
Earth for evaluation.
All 24 fluid processing apparatus (FPA) sets, containing a total of 192
individual FPA's were successfully processed. One set was inadvertently
deactivated early, but the science was recovered with a workaround procedure.
Another FPA set was terminated late with no significant loss of scientific data.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND ANATOMICAL RODENT rXPERIHENT
The objective of the Physiological and Anatomical Rodent Experiment (PARE) was
to investigate physiological and anatomical changes in rodents exposed to
microgravity.
The crew observed the animals and the animal enclosure module as planned
throughout the mission. Temperatures were much as expected and the ground
controls also functioned as expected.
SOLID SURFACE COMBUSTION EXPERIMENT
The objective of the Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE) was to measure
flame-spread rate, solid--phase temperature, and gas-phase temperature for
flames. Data will be used to validate flame-spread models to improve the safety
of spEze travel. The two SSCE burn operations planned for the mission were
completed satisfactorily, and no problems were encountered.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
Fourteen development test objectives were assigned to the STS-54 mission. Of
these, 12 were accomplished and are discussed in the following paragraphs.
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were collected and
recorded on the modular auxiliary data system (MADS) recorder for this data-only
DTO. The data have been processed and given to the sponsor for evaluation, and
the results will be presented in separate documentation.
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were collected and
recorded on the MADS recorder for this data-only DTO. The data have been
processed and given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be
presented in separate documentation.
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were collected and
recorded on the MADS recorder for this data-only DTO. The data have been
forwarded to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were collected and recorded on the
MADS recorder for this data-only DTO. The data have been forwarded to the
sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
DTO 312 - ET Thermal Protection Subsystem Performance - Two full rolls and one
partial roll of 35-mm film were taken with a Nikon F4 camera equipped with a
300-mm lens and a 2x extender which together provide an effective 600-mm focal
length lens. Magazines 27 and 28 each contained 37 photographs with excellent
exposure. T±e first frame was taken on magazine 27 at 13:14:13:45 G.m.t.
(00:00:14:15 MET) and the last frame was taken at 13:14:15:33 G.m.t.
(00:00:16:03 MET). The first frame taken from magazine 28 at 13:14:16:37 G.m.t.
(00:00:17:07 MET), and the last frame was taken 4 minutes 12 seconds later.
The seven additional frames that were obtained on magazine 36 were exposed
between 3 minutes and 5 minutes after magazine 28. The duration of ET
acquisition was 12 minutes 9 seconds.
Magazine 27 viewed the nose cone/ogive and the right side (+Y axis) of the ET.
Magazine 28 showed the aft dome and the left side (-Y/+Z axis).
In addition to the photography taken from the flight deck, 60 good quality
frames of the ET were taken on magazine 51 with the 35-mm umbilical well camera.
These frames provided views of the LH 2 tank TPS acreage (+Z side), the aft dome,
and the ET nose. Data were also obtained on magazine 52 from the 16-mm camera
with a 5-mm lens that was also located in the umbilical well. These data were
used to perform the analysis presented in the following paragraphs.
Magazine 57 of the 16-mm film taken from the umbilical well during SRB and ET
separation and the early portion of the on-orbit phase showed a small
metallic-appearing disk-shaped object with a probable hollow center shortly
after ET separation (Flight Problem STS-54-I-01). This object was visible for
almost 200 frames of the 16-mm film. At about the same time, a small
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metallic-appearing rod-shaped object with possibly a hollow end was noted, and
it was shown in almost 400 frames of the film (Flight Problem STS-54-I-01). The
third item noted was a flexible tape-like object, and it was noted in 187
frames (Flight Problem STS-54-I-01).
Relative measurements of the three metallic appearing objects were also made.
The actual size of these objects could not be determined because no adequate
reference was available in the field of view for comparative scaling. The scale
is not linear with trajectory because the 5 mm camera lens does not have flat
optics and the objects are not near the center of the field of view.
The disk-shaped object was seen between 8 minutes 59 seconds and 9 minutes 0
seconds MET (first observed 11.335 seconds after ET separation). The ratio of
the outside diameter to the height of the disk-shaped object was determined to
be 4.2 to 1 (frame 7511). The ratio of the outside diameter to the inner
diameter of this object was 3.2 to 1 (frame 7461).
The rod-shaped debris was seen between 8 minutes 59.5 seconds and 9 minutes
5.7 seconds MET (first observed at 11.65 seconds after ET separation). The
ratio of the major axis to the diameter was determined to be 16.2 to 1. The
measurements of the rod-shaped object was made on frame 7448.
The tape-like debris was seen between 9 minutes 1.6 seconds and 9 minutes
02.4 seconds (first seen 13.63 seconds after ET separation). The longest
dimension of the tape-like object was 13.6 analyzer units (frame 7935) and the
width of the object is 2.5 analyzer units (frame 7913). The thickness of the
thin dimension was 1.2 analyzer units (frame 7936).
DTO 412 - Fuel Cell On-Orbit Shutdown/Restart - Fuel cell 2 was successfully
shut down and restarted. Temperature data were collected and have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation. The Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem section of this
report contains a detailed discussion of this activity.
DTO 520 - Edwards Lakebed Runway Bearing Strength and Rolling Friction
Assessment for Orbiter Landings - This DTO was not accomplished as the landing
occurred at KSC.
DTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System - The Orbiter drag chute was de ployed during
the derotation and the drag chute operated satisfactorily. Details are
contained in the Structures and Mechanical subsystem section of this report.
DTO 648 - Electronic Still Photography Test - The electronic still camera was
operated and no problems were reported. The photography has been given to the
sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 656 - PGSC Single Event Upset Monitor - This DTO was accomplished and the
data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 662 - Extended Duration Orbiter WCS Evaluation - The evaluation of the
Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) WCS was completed very satisfactorily with only
one minor problem. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem section of this report contains
a detailed discussion of EDO WCS operations and problems.
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DTO 700-3 - Atmospheric Effects on Star Tracker Performance - Data were taken on
three orbits and have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting in
separate documentation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not accomplished as
crosswinds did not meet the minimum requirements for this DTO.
DTO 1210 - EVA Operation Procedures/Training - This DTO was accomplished with a
4 hour 27 minute 50 second EVA. A discussion of the EVA is contained in the
Extravehicular Activity section of this report.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
Twelve Detailed Supplementary Objectives (DSO's) were assigned to the STS-54
mission and all 12 were accomplished. Each one is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
DSO 316 - Bioreactor/Flow and Particle Trajectory in Microgravity - The two
planned tests were completed and the data have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation and documenting in separate publications.
DSO 321 - Frequency Interference Measurement - This DSO was completed and the
data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting. The results
will be presented in separate documentation.
DSO 322 - Human Lymphocyte Locomotion in Microgravity - This DSO operated as
planned and the data and hardware have been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
The sponsor will provide the results in separate documentation.
DSO 476 - In-Flight Aerobic Exercise (Rower) - This was an EDO buildup medical
evaluation DSO. All exercise sessions were completed, and the data have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crew Members - Data for this DSO were
gathered during preflight and postflight operations only. The sponsor has the
data and will report in separate documentation after data evaluation.
DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress - This was an
EDO buildup medical evaluation DSO. Data were collected for this DSO and have
been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting in separate
documentation.
DSO 604 - Visual-Vestibular Integration - Both 0I-1 and 0I-3 - This was an EDO
buildup medical evaluation DSO. These investigations were completed and the
data were given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
DSO 605 - Postflight Recovery of Postural Equilibrium Control - This was an EDO
buildup medical evaluation DSO, and data were collected during the preflight and
postflight periods only. The sponsor is in possession of the data and will
report the results in separate documentation after completion of the evaluation.
DSO 802 - Educational Activities - The crew performed the live downlink with
four schools that were planned. In addition, several other sessions were taped
for use after completion of the flight.
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DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Data were collected for this DSO and have
been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting in separate
documentation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Data were collected for this
DSO and have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - Data were collected for this DSO and
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting.
PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and reviewed.
Following launch day, but during the mission, 54 of 55 expected launch films
were also reviewed. The review produced no evidence of in-flight anomalies.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
The results of the ET tank analysis are presented in the Detailed Test
Objectives section of this report.
In addition, onboard video coverage of the six batteries associated with the
TDRS payload in the aft Orbiter payload bay area was examined as well as two
prelaunch closeout pictures of the six batteries. The analysis of the video
data was performed to determine if any postlaunch damage to the batteries could
be detected.
A visual comparison of the closeout views with the onboard video views showed no
obvious signs of damage to any of the six batteries or associated structures.
The edges of the battery boxes appeared straight, and the covers to the battery
boxes appeared intact (similar to the closeout views). The multilayer
insulation wrapping on the batteries was not torn, discolored, or misshapen at
the level of detail present in the videos. The multilayer insulation covering
over the individual batteries had a wrinkled appearance that was consistent with
the prelaunch closeout photography. No indications of liquid or vapors were
detected in the onboard video views. An analysis of the video from each camera
follows:
a. Camera A - A discoloration was present on the white cover of the port
forward battery, but this discoloration was determined to be cat;sed by shadowing
when viewed over a period of time. The cabling going to the middle group of
batteries appeared to be positioned normally. The wrinkling of the multilayer
insulation on the starboard forward battery did not appear to be excessive when
compared to the prelaunch closeout photography.
b. Camera B - Wrinkling of the multilayer insulation covering the port rear
and center rear batteries was visible. The covering over the top of these two
batteries appeared intact.
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c. Camera C - The visible portion of the starboard aft battery appeared in
very good condition. The right side of the forward and aft center batteries
were uneven in appearance, and this may have been due to wrinkling of the
multilayer insulation. The tops of the two batteries had a normal appearance.
The tape-like stripping material between the two center batteries had an uneven
appearance, but it could not be confirmed to be abnormal because of the lighting
and viewing angle.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
Nine landing videos were received and reviewed on the day of landing. The
following items of interest were noted during the post-landing review of the
video views. None of the observations were considered anomalous.
A light discoloration of the tiles was noted on the upper side of the body flap
on both the left and right sides. Also, a portion of the dome mounted heat
shield (DMHS) around SSME 2 was torn. Discolorations were noted on the inside
of the LO  umbilical well door.
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TABLE I.- STS-54 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
APU activation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 13:13:54:42.21
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 13:13:54:42.83
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 13:13:54:43.56
SRB HPU activations LH HPU system A start command 13:13:59:02.169
LH HPU system B start command 13:13:59:02.329
RH HPU system A start command 13:13:59:02.489
RH HPU system B start command 13:13:59:02.649
Main propulsion Engine 3 start command accepted 13:13:59:23.448
System start Engine 2 start command accepted 13:13:59:23.561
Engine 1 start command accepted 13:13:59:23.685
SRB ignition command SRB ignition command to SRB 13:13:59:29.989
(lift-off)
Throttle up to Engine 2 command accepted 13:13:59:34.001
104 percent thrust s Engine 1 command accepted 13:13:59:34.006
Engine 3 command accepted 13:13:59:34.008
Throttle down to Engine 2 command accepted 13:13:59:56.882
72 percent thrusts Engine 1 command accepted 13:13:59:56.886
Engine 3 command accepted 13:13:59:56.888
Maximum dynamic Derived ascent dynamic 13:14:00:23
pressure (q) pressure
Throttle up to Engine 2 command accepted 13:14:00:26.483
104 percent thrusts Engine 1 command accepted 13:14:00:26.486
Engine 3 command accepted 13:14:00:26.489
Both SRM's chamber RH SRM chamber pressure 13:14:01:29.669
pressure at 50 psis mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure 13:14:01 30.909
mid-range select
End SRM actions RH SRM chamber pressure 13:14:01:32.869
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure 13:14:01:32.879
mid-range select
SRB separation command SRB separation command flag 13:14:01:36
SRB physical LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 13:14:01:35.949
separations RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 13:14:01:35.949
Throttle down for Engine 3 command accepted 13:14:07:02.292
3g accelerationa Engine 2 command accepted 13:14:07:02.295
Engine 1 command accepted 13:14:07:02.332
3g acceleration Total load factor 13:14:07:06.1
Throttle dawn to Engine 1 command accepted 13:14:07:53.492
67 percent thrusts Engine 2 command accepted 13:14:07:53.498
Engine 3 command accepted 13:14:07:53.534
Engine Shutdowns Engine 1 command accept 13:14:07:59.932
Engine 3 command accept 13:14:07:59.936
Engine 2 command accept 13:14:07:59.974
MECO Command flag 13:14:08:00
Confirm flag 13:14:08:01
a MSFC supplied data.
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TABLE I.- STS-54 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
ET separation ET separation command flag 13:14:08:19
OMS-1 ignition Left engine bi-prop valve Not performed -
position direct insertion
Right engine bi-prop valve trajectory flown
position
OMS-1 cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
APU deactivation APU-3 GG chamber pressure 13:14:13:50.24
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 13:14:15:12.66
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 13:14:15:14.21
OMS-2 ignition Right engine bi-prop valve 13:14:39:23.4
position
Left engine bi-prop valve 13:14:39:23.6
position
OMS-2 cutoff Right engine bi-prop valve 13:14:41:47.2
position
Left engine bi-prop valve 13:14:41:47.4
position
Payload bay door open PLBD right open 1 13:15:39:52
PLBD left open 1 13:15:41:11
TDRS/IUS Deploy Voice call 13:20:13:00
OMS-3 ignition Right engine bi-prop valve Not applicable
position
Left engine bi-prop valve 13:20:27:26.1
position
OMS-3 cutoff Right engine bi-prop valve Not applicable
position
Left engine bi-prop valve 13:20:27:59.8
position
OMS-4 ignition Right engine bi-prop valve 14:16:08:42.3
position
Left engine bi-prop valve Not applicable
position
OMS-4 cutoff Right engine bi-prop valve 14:16:09:09.6
position
Left engine bi-prop valve Not applicable
position
Airlock Depressuri- Airlock differential pressure 1 17:10:45:22
ization
Airlock Repressuri- Airlock differential pressure 1 17:15:17:42
Fuel Cell 2 Shutdown Fuel cell 2 ready 18:07:46:40
Flight control
system checkout
APU start APU-3 GG chamber pressure 18:08:23:42.55
APU stop APU-1 GG chamber pressure 18:08:38:28.64
Fuel Cell 2 Startup Fuel cell 2 oagen valve open 18:16:30:31
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TABLE 1.- STS-54 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded)
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
Payload bay door PLBD left close 1 19:10:02:22
close PLBD right close 1 19:10:04:14
APU activation APU-2 GG chamber pressure 19:12:33:09.41
for entry APU-1 GG chamber pressure 19:12:54:02.62
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 19:12:54:03.74
Deorbit maneuver Right engine bi-prop valve 19:12:38:10.2
ignition position
Left engine bi-prop valve 19:12:38:10.3
position
Deorbit maneuver Right engine bi-prop valve 19:12:40:43.6
cutoff position
Left engine bi-prop valve 19:12:40:43.7
position
Entry interface Current orbital altitude 19:13:06:59
(400K) above reference ellipsoid
Blackout ends Data locked at high sample No blackout
rate
Terminal area Major mode change (305) 19:13:31:37
energy management
Main landing gear LE MLG tire pressure 19:13:37:47
contact RH MLG tire pressure 19:13:37:49
Main landing gear LH MLG weight on wheels 19:13:37:49
weight on wheels RE MLG weight on wheels 19:13:37:49
Drag chute deploy Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts 19:13:37:59.8
Nose landing gear NLG tire pressure 19:13:38:02
contact
Nose landing gear NLG WT on Wheels -1 19:13:38:03
weight on wheels
Drag chute jettison Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts 19:13:38:22.6
Wheels stop Velocity with respect to 19:13:38:36
runway
APU deactivation APU-3 GG chamber pressure 19:13:55:11.16
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 19:13:56:15.62
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 19:13:56:56.10
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TABLE II.- STS-54 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
WQ
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-54-V-01 WS8 3 No Cooling 013:14:14 G.m.t. During ascent, WSS 3 failed to initiate cooling of the APU 3 lube oil
IM 54RF01 while operating on controller A.
	
HSU 3 was switched to controller B.
PR HYD-5-04-0104 Again, no cooling was evident.	 Approximately 40 seconds after APU 3
shutdown, WSB 3 began spraying on controller B.	 APU 3/WSB 3 was used
for FCS checkout and performance was nominal on both controllers.
	 The
performance was also nominal during entry.	 Preliminary analysis
indicates a freeze-up occurred.
KSC: Troubleshooting plan has been developed for KSC. 	 Will load MB
core with 4.4 lb of water (nominal is 3.5 lb).
STS-54-V-02 Camera Anomalies
a. CCTV Camera D - No 017:17:50 G.m.t. a. Camera D image was intermittent, sometimes producing normal quality
Image (Intermittent) a)DR BH330019 picture and sometimes out-of-focus picture. 	 camera will be removed
and returned to JSC for evaluation.
b. CCTV Camera B Problem b)DR SH330018 b. During the EVA, camera B was being used in the split screen mode and
During Split screen a synchronization problem occurred between camera B and the CCTV
Operations system.	 After cycling the camera power, split-screen operations
were nominal.	 Analysis indicates that the problem was caused by
Camera B and the video switching unit (VSV). 	 camera will be
removed and returned to JSC for evaluation
c. CCTV camera A Momentary c)DR BH330055 c. Unexpected red and green lines were noted on camera A. 	 Camara will
Red and Green Lines will be removed and sent to JSC for evaluation.
d. CCTV camera C High-Cain d)DR BH330054 d_ It was reported in-flight that only the brightest stars could be
Anomaly seen when looking at low-light scene.	 Possible high-gain circuit
problem.	 Camera will be removed and sent to JSC for evaluation.
sTS-54-V-03 EDO WCs Commode Fault 016:14:22:09 G.m.t. The Wr.S compactor caused the fault light to illuminate during the
Light on IM 54RF02 retraction phase of the compaction cycle.	 Postflight, the vendor could
IPR 57v-0006 not duplicate the problem, but did note a difference in the results
from the troubleshooting current signature in comparison to the ATP
data.	 The plan is to replace the snubber (foam) to further dampen the
end of travel current spike.	 Will rework snubber at vendor, then
reinstall and retest the unit.
STS-54-V-04 Rudder Speedbrake 016:21:06 G.m.t. The rudder speedbrake switching valve indication (V58X1001E) failed to
Switching Valve Indication IPA 57V--0012 show that hydraulic system 3 was selected while hydraulic circulation
pump 3 was operating at nominal pressure. 	 Troubleshooting in-flight
indicates that with additional pressure, the valve will switch to the
the proper position.
KSc:	 Test at 500 psi completed and data analysis in progress.
sTS-54-V-05 RCS Thruster RLR Failed 018:07:58 G.m.t. During the RCS hot-fire test, thruster R1R failed off and was
off IM 54RF03 deselected by RCS RM.	 Both oxidizer and fuel injector temperature
PR RPO4-11-0353 trends were nominal indicating that there was at least partial flow
into the chamber.	 Failure most likely a failure of the oxidizer main
stage valve to open.
KSC:	 Remove and replace thruster.	 Spare available at Ksc.
TABLE II.- STS-54 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
W
h+
number Title Reference Ccmasnts
STS-54-V-06 Low Nitrogen Leak Rate/ 018:19:51 G.m.t. Nitrogen usage was unusually low (approximately 1.8 lbal/day, should be
odor from Wet Trash IM 54RF04 be 4.5 lbm/day) coupled with crew report of odor coming from the wet
(Volume F) PR ECL-5-04-0293 trash (Volume F).	 These factors indicate that adequate venting was not
being provided to the volume F wet trash.
KSC:	 Reported that a dynatube adapter plug was in the opening of the
TRANSFERRED TO KSC wet trash to vacuum.	 No hardware troubleshooting required.
Will remove cap and correct procedure to preclude recurrence of
problem.
STS-54-V-07 Fusl Cell 2 and 3 019:13:30 G.m.t. Leakage was indicated past the fuel cell alternate water line check
Alternate Water Lines U64RFOS valves for fuel cell 2 and 3.
Temperature Increasing KSC:	 Perform modified OMR.cD check valve checks.	 Chit to be written
specifying the test plan.
STS-54-V-08 Hydraulic System 3 Pump 013:14:14 G.m.t. Following the early APU 3 shutdown after MECO because of the APU 3
outlet Pressure High Post- IPR 57V-0008 bearing over-temperature, the hydraulic supply pressure failed to decay
Ascent AM Shutdown U64AF09 as expected.	 The pressure initially dropped to about 1600 psis, then
increased and stayed locked up at about 2400 paia for more than
40 seconds following APU 3 shutdown. 	 The pressure bled off when the
SSME/TVC isolation valves were closed. 	 Post-landing troubleshooting
did not repeat the condition seen during ascent.
KSC:	 Test partially completed and data analysis in progress.
STS-54-V-09 Floodlight Failures 017:10:38 G.m.t.
a) Forward Starboard IM54RF06 a and b) wring payload bay floodlight power up, the forward starboard
b) Mid Starboard IM54RF07 and mid starboard floodlights did not come on.
c) Mid Port IM54RP08 b) The midport floodlight came on approximately one hour after switch
IPA 57V-0010 activation.
a. PR DDC-5-04-0040 There were indications of arcing on all three floodlights. 	 All three
b. PR DDC-544-0041 of the floodlights plus the FEA 2 have been removed and replaced for
c. PR DDC-5-04-0042 planned testing.
FEA: PR PEL-5-04-
0772
STS-54-V-10 APU 3 Bearing Temperature 019:13:27 G.m.t. wring entry, approximately 35 minutes after APU start, the APU 3
Erratic IPR 57V-0007 gearbox bearing temperature 2 (V46TO362A) became erratic for a period
of about 17 seconds.	 It then recovered and operated nominally
throughout the remainder of the mission and postlanding soakback.
KSC:	 Troubleshooting at KSC did not repeat the problem.
STS-54-V-11 12W Battery Charger Noisy MOM The Emu power supply/battery charger was reported postflight as
exhibiting excessive audible noise.	 Will ask for DTO an STS-51 to
measure noise, so the necessary corrective actions can be performed.
KSC:	 No KSC activity required.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions
as these items are used in this document.
ABS	 ammonia boiler system
APU
	 auxiliary power unit
ARS
	 Atmospheric revitalization system
ATCS	 Active thermal control system
CCTV	 closed circuit television
CGBA	 Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus
CHROMEX Chromosome and Plant Cell Division in Space
COMSEC Communications Security
CO	 Carbon dioxide
DM9S	 dome-mounted heat shield
DPS	 data processing system
DSO	 Detailed Supplementary Objective
DTC	 Development Test Objective
AV	 differential velocity
DXS	 Diffuse X-ray Spectrometer
EDO	 Extended Duration Orbiter
EMU
	 Extravehicular Mobility Unit
EPDC	 electrical power distribution and control subsystem
ET	 External Tank
EVA	 extravehicular activity
FCS	 flight control system
FDA	 fault detection and annunciation subsystem
FES
	 flash evaporator system
FPA	 fluid processing apparatus
GFE	 Government furnished equipment
GG	 gas generator
GGVM	 gas generator valve module
GH2	gaseous hydrogen
G.m.t.	 Greenwich mean time
GN2	gaseous nitrogen
GO2	 gaseous oxygen
HPFTP
	 high pressure fuel turbopump
HPOTP	 high pressure oxidizer turbopump
HPU	 hydraulic power unit
IAPU	 improved auxiliary power unit
ICD	 Interface Control Document
IMU	 inertial measurement unit
Isp	 specific impulse
IUS	 Inertial Upper Stage
JSC	 Johnson Space Center
KSC	 Kennedy Space Center
LCC	 Launch Commit Criteria
LESC	 Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
L22	liquid hydrogen
L02	liquid oxygen
B-1
LSEAT
MADS
MECO
MET
MLG
MPS
MSFC
NLG
NPSP
NSTS
OMRSD
OMS
PAL
PARE
PLBD
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
RCC
RCS
RIMU
RM
rms
RSRM
Si, A.
S&A
SRB
SRM
SRSS
SSC
SSCE
SSME
STI
TACAN
TAGS
TCS
TDRS
TDRSS
TPS
TVC
USAF
USN
V
MCS
{TSB
Launch System Evaluation and Advisory Team
modular auxiliary data system
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
main landing gear
main propulsion system
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
nose landing gear
net positive suction pressure
National Space Transportation System
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and
orbital maneuvering subsystem
protuberance air load
Physiological and Anatomical Rodent Experiment
payload bay door
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
power reactant storage and distribution
reinforced carbon carbon
reaction control subsystem
redundant inertial measurement unit
redundancy management
root mean square
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
South Atlantic Anomaly
safe and arm
Solid Rocket Booster
solid rocket motor
Shuttle Range Safety System
secondary seal cavity
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment
Space Shuttle main engine
Shuttle thermal imager
Tactical Air Navigation
text and graphics system
thermal control system
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
thermal protection system/subsystem
thrust vector control
U. S. Air Force
U. S. Navy
volt
Waste Collection System
water spray boiler
Specifications Document
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